Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution

Abstract

What types of states are more likely to resort to legal methods of peaceful resolution in attempting to resolve their territorial disputes? We posit that two separate mechanisms affect states’ decisions to choose legal methods of peaceful resolution: the legal mechanism – domestic rule of law and the political mechanism – win/loss record. The interplay of both of these mechanisms explains strategic choices made by states with regards to arbitration and adjudication. Empirical analysis of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1985-2006 shows that states are more likely to return to international legal venues if they have a positive experience with these methods. However, a positive win/loss record matters more for rule-of-law challenger states. These states will still consider resorting to legal venues even after having lost in these venues. Low rule-of-law states, on the other hand, exhibit moderate enthusiasm toward legal methods of peaceful resolution even with a positive win/loss record. These states are also very unlikely to resort to arbitration and adjudication after having suffered a territorial loss in international legal venues.