Bicameral Agenda Control: Examining the Effects of Procedural Tools on Congressional Policy Outcomes, 1883-1937

31 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 28 Aug 2011

See all articles by Jamie L. Carson

Jamie L. Carson

University of Georgia

Anthony J. Madonna

University of Georgia - Department of Political Science

Jason M. Roberts

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: August 26, 2011

Abstract

One of the key diff erences between the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate is their diff ering agenda control mechanisms. In the House, since the late nineteenth century, a simple majority of those present and voting has been able to adopt special rules that can dictate which bills are considered, when they are considered, how long the debate will carry on, and what, if any, amendments will be off ered to the bill.

By contrast, the Senate has no equivalent majority agenda control mechanism. In this paper, we begin to assess the eff ects of diff ering agenda setting institutions on coalition size and policy outcomes across the two chambers. Using a combination of case study and systematic evidence, we show that the development of special rules in the House served to reduce the size of legislative coalitions, increase chamber efficiency, and restrict overall amending activity relative to the Senate.

Suggested Citation

Carson, Jamie L. and Madonna, Anthony J. and Roberts, Jason M., Bicameral Agenda Control: Examining the Effects of Procedural Tools on Congressional Policy Outcomes, 1883-1937 (August 26, 2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900826

Jamie L. Carson (Contact Author)

University of Georgia ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Anthony J. Madonna

University of Georgia - Department of Political Science ( email )

104 Baldwin Hall
Athens, GA 30602
United States

Jason M. Roberts

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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