The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law

The Journal of Politics, 75 (4): 1038-1050, 2013

37 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 10 Jun 2017

See all articles by Tiberiu Dragu

Tiberiu Dragu

New York University

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

This article builds upon the observation that political rulers have to rely upon administrators to implement their policy decisions to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing in practice. We show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators' expectation that rights violations might be costly in the future, when the current ruler's grip on power ends. We also show how the effectiveness of legal limits depends on administrators' expectation about each others' actions when asked to execute an illegal policy, which allows for the possibility that the law itself might induce compliance expressively, by making a particular behavior salient. The analysis contributes to a general understanding of the mechanisms by which law can effectively limit the arbitrary power of the government.

Keywords: rule of law, legal limits, administrators, coordination

Suggested Citation

Dragu, Tiberiu and Polborn, Mattias K., The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law (2013). The Journal of Politics, 75 (4): 1038-1050, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1901318

Tiberiu Dragu (Contact Author)

New York University ( email )

19 West 4th Street
Office Room Number 220
New York, NY 10012
United States
2129988513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://wp.nyu.edu/tiberiu_dragu/

Mattias K. Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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