Competition, Preference Uncertainty, and Jamming: A Strategic Communication Experiment

39 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 25 Aug 2011

See all articles by William Minozzi

William Minozzi

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science

Jonathan Woon

University of Pittsburgh

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Many political environments in established democracies are characterized by competition and information asymmetries. These features, when combined with uncertainty about the preferences of information providers, yield opportunities for those providers to jam, or impede the communication of information to those who need it. We describe a game-theoretic laboratory experiment in which subjects play a strategic information transmission game with two senders who have private information about their preferences. Subjects exhibit some behavior consistent with their strategic incentives, but they also differ from equilibrium predictions in systematic ways. Neither increases in payoffs, nor learning, nor limited strategic sophistication eliminates these differences.

Keywords: strategic communication, cheap talk, laboratory experiment, game theory, bounded rationality

Suggested Citation

Minozzi, William and Woon, Jonathan, Competition, Preference Uncertainty, and Jamming: A Strategic Communication Experiment (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1901365

William Minozzi (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Jonathan Woon

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

4600 Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.pitt.edu/~woon

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