Examining the Impact of Public Attention on Fundraising in U.S. Senate Elections

30 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 26 Aug 2011

See all articles by Curtis Ellis

Curtis Ellis

Auburn Montgomery

Colin Swearingen

Oklahoma House of Representatives

Joseph T. Ripberger

University of Oklahoma

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

Does public attention to political candidates impact fundraising margins in U.S. Senate elections? Applying a novel conceptualization of public attention, we examine all U.S. Senate elections from 2004 through 2010 and find that increases in relative public attention relate to increases in relative fundraising margins in open seat races. Incorporating a mixed methods approach, we take the question one step further to explore whether or not all attention to candidates is "good" attention, in terms of fundraising margins. Evidence from the Allen/Webb (VA) Senate contest of 2006 suggests that all attention is NOT "good" attention. It appears that candidates can supply attention grabbing action that increases relative public attention while stimulating exceptional losses in relative fundraising margins. Further research must clearly theorize conditions under which supplying public attention grabbing behavior could ultimately damage political campaigns.

Keywords: public attention, U.S. Senate, campaigns, Senate election, fundraising, campaign finance, campaign effects

Suggested Citation

Ellis, Curtis and Swearingen, Colin and Ripberger, Joseph T., Examining the Impact of Public Attention on Fundraising in U.S. Senate Elections (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1901704

Curtis Ellis (Contact Author)

Auburn Montgomery ( email )

Montgomery, AL
United States

Colin Swearingen

Oklahoma House of Representatives ( email )

2300 N Lincoln Blvd
Oklahoma city, OK 73105
United States

Joseph T. Ripberger

University of Oklahoma ( email )

307 W Brooks
Norman, OK 73019
United States

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