Examining the Impact of Public Attention on Fundraising in U.S. Senate Elections

Abstract

Does public attention to political candidates impact fundraising margins in U.S. Senate elections? Applying a novel conceptualization of public attention, we examine all U.S. Senate elections from 2004 through 2010 and find that increases in relative public attention relate to increases in relative fundraising margins in open seat races. Incorporating a mixed methods approach, we take the question one step further to explore whether or not all attention to candidates is "good" attention, in terms of fundraising margins. Evidence from the Allen/Webb (VA) Senate contest of 2006 suggests that all attention is NOT "good" attention. It appears that candidates can supply attention grabbing action that increases relative public attention while stimulating exceptional losses in relative fundraising margins. Further research must clearly theorize conditions under which supplying public attention grabbing behavior could ultimately damage political campaigns.

Keywords: public attention, U.S. Senate, campaigns, Senate election, fundraising, campaign finance, campaign effects