22 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 12 Sep 2011
Date Written: 2011
Since electoral systems structure how representation works, it is not surprising that changes in electoral rules and their consequences always attract close attention. This paper explores how some differences in less-high-profile rules might have caused divergent speed and extent of reaching some theoretically expected political consequences.
We compare two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, because both of them abandoned the decades old single nontransferable vote multimember district (SNTV-MMD) system and endorsed the similar mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Focusing on three differences between Japan and Taiwan, including dual candidacy, regional PR constituency, and PR threshold, we tap their possible consequences on macro-level party systems and district-level strategic voting patterns. Further careful comparative studies and rigorous causal analyses are called for to study this topic.
Keywords: mixed-member electoral system, effective number of parties, SF ratio, Taiwan, Japan
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Huang, Chi, Political Consequences of the MMM Systems in Taiwan and Japan (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1903016