Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda.

42 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 9 Nov 2013

See all articles by Guy Grossman

Guy Grossman

University of Pennsylvania

William Walker Hanlon

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 8, 2013

Abstract

We offer a framework for analyzing the impact of monitoring --- a commonly recommended solution to poor leadership --- on the quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations in low-income countries. In our model, groups may face a trade-off between leader ability and effort. If the group's ability to monitor the leader is low, then the leader may exert too little effort. A higher level of monitoring increases leader effort, raising the value of the public good. However, more intense monitoring may also drive higher ability members to opt-out of candidacy, reducing public goods value. The result is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. The trade-off between leader effort and ability, however, only exists in the presence of sufficient private income opportunities. These predictions are assessed using original data gathered from Ugandan farmer associations.

Keywords: Leadership quality, Citizen-candidate, Political selection, Public goods, Monitoring

Suggested Citation

Grossman, Guy and Hanlon, William Walker, Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda. (May 8, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1903119 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1903119

Guy Grossman (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

133 S. 36th Street
Perelman Center for Political Science and Economic
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
(215) 898-4209 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://web.sas.upenn.edu/ggros/

William Walker Hanlon

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

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