A Model of Agents Persuasion and Types Competition in a Cultural Evolution Framework

16 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2011 Last revised: 21 May 2013

See all articles by Fabrizio Panebianco

Fabrizio Panebianco

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Date Written: July 22, 2011

Abstract

This paper analyses the evolution of types in a society with an evolutionary game framework in which types evolve not only depending on how much they are fit but also on how much they are able to persuade others about their fitness during a cultural competition process. This creates a kind of payoffs redistribution so that it is possible to reach equilibria not feasible under standard dynamics. We first provide necessary conditions for a generic matrix and generic class of cultural competition mechanisms in order to observe polimorphic equilibria, proposing that the set of parameters such that a stable polimorphic equilibrium exists under cultural competition is a subset of the set of parameters for this to be possible under the standard case. Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for polimorphic equilibrium stability are provided in the case of specific competition rules at each competition level. We then analyse the prisoner’s dilemma framework finding that, even in this case, stable and unstable polimorphic equilibria may arise, depending on the specific parametrization and level of cultural competition among types. We then show that while a little competition among cultural types helps to maintain types heterogeneity in the long run, this effect is non monotone in the level of competition of the society.

Keywords: Cultural Evolution, Cultural Transmission, Evolutionary Selection, Replicator Dynamics

JEL Classification: C70, C73, Z13

Suggested Citation

Panebianco, Fabrizio, A Model of Agents Persuasion and Types Competition in a Cultural Evolution Framework (July 22, 2011). CISEPS Research Paper No. 8/2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1903739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1903739

Fabrizio Panebianco (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

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