Union Myopia and the Taxation of Capital

Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 299-315, Fall 1995

17 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2011

See all articles by Dwight Lee

Dwight Lee

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Robert L. Sexton

Pepperdine University - Economics Department

Philip E. Graves

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Date Written: 1995

Abstract

After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.

Keywords: unions, wages, taxation, capital formation, international competitiveness, incentives

JEL Classification: D21, D23, D40, D78, M14, M52, L20, J31, J38

Suggested Citation

Lee, Dwight and Sexton, Robert L. and Graves, Philip E., Union Myopia and the Taxation of Capital (1995). Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 299-315, Fall 1995. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1904443

Dwight Lee

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Robert L. Sexton

Pepperdine University - Economics Department ( email )

24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States

Philip E. Graves (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309-0256
United States

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