Elite Mobilizations for Antitakeover Legislation, 1982-1990

26 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2011

See all articles by Timothy J. Vogus

Timothy J. Vogus

Vanderbilt University - Organizational Behavior

Gerald F. Davis

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: November 7, 2004


Elite mobilizations play a key role in shaping the contours of social institutions. Prior research has demonstrated that mobilizations and the resulting struggles between competing elites shape the social structure of markets (Fligstein 1996), corporate governance regimes (Davis and Thompson 1994), and organizations (Fligstein 1990; Zald and Berger 1978). More recent examples in the popular press also demonstrate the use of the tactics of popular social movements by business elites. Corporate elites in the Philippines, dissatisfied with the loss of foreign direct investment and governmental corruption, supported throngs of protesters and helped them stage multiple demonstrations that led to the ouster of President Estrada (Frank 2000). Demonstrations of similar magnitude (also led by the business elite) have recently taken place in Italy (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) and South Korea. A form of elite mobilization was previewed in the United States during the late 1980s, as institutional investors sought corporate governance reform and state legislatures across the country were pressed by coalitions among business and labor to pass legislation to limit hostile takeovers of local companies (Davis and Thompson 1994). In this chapter, we use a social movement framework to study this process as a movement/countermovement dynamic, focusing on the spread of state antitakeover laws among the fifty American states.

Suggested Citation

Vogus, Timothy J. and Davis, Gerald F., Elite Mobilizations for Antitakeover Legislation, 1982-1990 (November 7, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1904612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1904612

Timothy J. Vogus (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Organizational Behavior ( email )

Nashville, TN 37203
United States

Gerald F. Davis

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-647-4737 (Phone)
734-936-0282 (Fax)

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