Improving Bid Efficiency for Humanitarian Food Aid Procurement

International Journal of Production Economics, Forthcoming

Posted: 4 Aug 2011 Last revised: 20 Apr 2015

See all articles by Aniruddha Bagchi

Aniruddha Bagchi

Kennesaw State University- Michael J. Coles College of Business

Jomon Aliyas Paul

Kennesaw State University- Michael J. Coles College of Business

Michael Maloni

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business

Date Written: August 4, 2011

Abstract

The competitive bid process used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian food aid is subject to bidder gaming that can increase prices and deter competition. Additionally, suppliers and carriers are matched after bid submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine the optimal auction mechanism to minimize gaming then justify pre-bid planning between suppliers and carriers using properties of the cost distribution functions. We operationalize these changes with a uniform price auction. The improved mechanism should deter gaming, enhance bid participation, and increase delivered food aid volumes.

Keywords: Auctions, procurement, humanitarian logistics

JEL Classification: D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Bagchi, Aniruddha and Paul, Jomon Aliyas and Maloni, Michael, Improving Bid Efficiency for Humanitarian Food Aid Procurement (August 4, 2011). International Journal of Production Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1905148

Aniruddha Bagchi (Contact Author)

Kennesaw State University- Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

United States

Jomon Aliyas Paul

Kennesaw State University- Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

United States

Michael Maloni

Kennesaw State University - Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )

1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States

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