Managerial and Decision Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 6 Sep 2011
Date Written: August 4, 2011
We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating equilibrium in our model depending on the parameters. Our analysis reveals that, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not only the high-quality firm, but also the low-quality firm chooses to disclose its product quality to soften the price competition.
Keywords: oligopoly, price competition, signaling, voluntary quality disclosure
JEL Classification: D82, L13, L15, M3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Caldieraro, Fabio and Shin, Dongsoo and Stivers, Andrew, Voluntary Quality Disclosure Under Price-Signaling Competition (August 4, 2011). Managerial and Decision Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1905267