Monopoly versus Competitive Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Pricing

24 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2011  

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: March 18, 2011

Abstract

The Klein-Leffler model explains how the benefit of future reputation can induce firms to produce high quality experience goods, either in a monopoly or an industry with competing firms. We show that reputation can be leveraged across products, but only by a firm with a monopoly on at least one product. Such a firm, however, may be able to capture the market for a competitive product by using umbrella pricing to make higher quality more credible than for firms without a monopoly base. Such monopoly extension increases social welfare, and can even benefit consumers, despite the increase in price. The expanding monopolist does not need to use bundling, and consumers are left better off, but otherwise this looks like classic monopoly leverage.

Keywords: Product quality, umbrella branding, economies of scope, reputation

JEL Classification: D43, K21

Suggested Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Monopoly versus Competitive Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Pricing (March 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1907227 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1907227

Eric Bennett Rasmusen (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

Enter your address line 1 here
Enter your address line 2 here
Bloomington, IN Enter your state here 47405
United States
812-855-9219 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://rasmusen.org

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Rank
195,018
Abstract Views
826