Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, p. 491, 2012
73 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2011 Last revised: 16 Aug 2012
Date Written: January 6, 2012
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a new global governance structure emerged. During and subsequent to the crisis, the G20 arose as a coordinating executive among international governance institutions. It set policy agendas, prioritized initiatives and, working through the Financial Stability Board, drew other governance institutions and networks such as the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade Organization, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions to set standards, monitor enforcement and compliance, and aid recovery. Its authority cross-cuts regimes and creates collaborative linkages between economic law and social issues such as food security and the environment. Its leadership role, born out of exigency, now continues to evolve as part of the new international economic law order.
The G20’s coordination of institutions and networks exemplifies a new form of global governance. Network coordination offers an opportunity to confront complex problems with a needed comprehensive approach. The institutions and networks engage in an ongoing dialectical process that propels standard setters towards convergence on a number of fronts. The actors in this process employ a variety of tools to forge consensus and the G20 leverages this consensus-creating process to achieve its goals. Unpacking these tools can help us tackle intricate questions that arise from this new structure. In particular, we focus on concerns of effectiveness and legitimacy originating from the G20’s coordination of multiple networks and institutions.
Keywords: international, governance, G20, financial regulation, IOSCO, Basel, IAIS, networks, economic law, Leaders Summit
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kelly, Claire and Cho, Sungjoon, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20 (January 6, 2012). Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, p. 491, 2012; Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 243. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1907845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1907845