'Regulation is Acquired by the Industry and is Designed and Operated Primarily for its Benefit?' A Test of Proactive vs. Reactive Corporate Regulatory Management in German Telecommunications

24 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2011

See all articles by Arnold Oskar Picot

Arnold Oskar Picot

Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management)

Jonathan Landgrebe

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: August 12, 2011

Abstract

Telecommunications regulation has been a widely discussed topic since most OECD countries started the process of privatization of the telecommunications market in the 90s. Undoubtedly, regulatory rules exert strong impact on business development and business strategy in those industries that are most affected by regulation, e.g. in network based industries. This paper belongs to the tradition of positive theory of regulation. It tries to better understand how the management of telecommunications companies deals with regulatory challenges that shape their strategic degrees of freedom. There has been little research on how companies structure their regulatory management from an organizational and strategic point of view. In this paper a framework for different styles of regulatory management is presented and empirically tested with regard to telecommunications companies in Germany.

Keywords: Regulation, Management, Telecommunication, Organization

Suggested Citation

Picot, Arnold Oskar and Landgrebe, Jonathan, 'Regulation is Acquired by the Industry and is Designed and Operated Primarily for its Benefit?' A Test of Proactive vs. Reactive Corporate Regulatory Management in German Telecommunications (August 12, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1908721

Arnold Oskar Picot (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )

Ludwigstraße 28
München, 80995
Germany
+49 89 2180-2252 (Phone)
0049-89-2180-3685 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.iom.bwl.uni-muenchen.de

Jonathan Landgrebe

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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