Public Good Provision and Legislative Voting Cohesion: An Experimental Study

34 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2011

See all articles by Chloe Tergiman

Chloe Tergiman

The Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: August 15, 2011

Abstract

Legislative paralysis stemming from tenuously-held or undisciplined coalitions haunts a large number of legislatures. Parliamentary democracies use the Vote of Confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 20% reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

Keywords: public good provision, legislative bargaining, laboratory experiment

Suggested Citation

Tergiman, Chloe, Public Good Provision and Legislative Voting Cohesion: An Experimental Study (August 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910309

Chloe Tergiman (Contact Author)

The Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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