Revealing Shorts: An Examination of Large Short Position Disclosures

63 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2011 Last revised: 4 Mar 2015

See all articles by Charles M. Jones

Charles M. Jones

Columbia Business School

Adam V. Reed

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School

William Waller

Tulane University - Finance & Economics

Date Written: March 2, 2015

Abstract

By 2012, all European Union countries began requiring the disclosure of large short positions. This regime change reduced short interest, bid-ask spreads, and the informativeness of prices. After specific disclosures, short-run abnormal returns are insignificantly negative, but 90-day cumulative abnormal returns are –5.23%. We find disclosures are likely to be followed by other disclosures, especially when the initial discloser is large or centrally located, but there is no subsequent increase in short interest, and prices do not subsequently reverse. These results indicate that large short sellers are well-informed, and that disclosures are not being used to coordinate manipulative attacks.

Keywords: short sales, short interest, securities lending, secondary equity offering

JEL Classification: G14

Suggested Citation

Jones, Charles M. and Reed, Adam V. and Waller, William, Revealing Shorts: An Examination of Large Short Position Disclosures (March 2, 2015). AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910372 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910372

Charles M. Jones (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
Uris Hall Rm 101
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-4109 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/cbs-directory/detail/cj88

Adam V. Reed

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

William Waller

Tulane University - Finance & Economics ( email )

A.B. Freeman School of Business
7 McAlister Drive
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

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