15 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2011 Last revised: 6 Jun 2012
Date Written: July 1, 2011
In this brief Article, I explore the growing empirical evidence in support of the public choice model of judicial decision making. Although legal scholars have traditionally been reluctant to engage in a critical inquiry into the role of judicial self-interest on judicial behavior, recent empirical studies confirm many of the predictions of the model. As a result, the public choice model has gained broad acceptance across a range of disciplines, courts, and even the U.S. public.
Keywords: judicial decision-making, public choice, law and economics
JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Shepherd, Joanna, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior (July 1, 2011). University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 5, 2011; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 11-164; Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-110. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910918