Marginal Cost Pricing and Eminent Domain
Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, Vol. 7, 2011
95 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2011 Last revised: 20 Mar 2012
Date Written: August 17, 2011
Abstract
There are three separate strands of literature in economics that are related to the efficiency of takings under eminent domain: one addresses the question of optimal compensation for properties that are taken, a second inquires how governments might learn the values of properties that they consider taking, while a third analyzes solutions to the problem of land assembly. This essay reviews these strands of literature and argues that the principle of marginal cost pricing can be used as a unifying principle for integrating them.
Keywords: eminent domain, just compensation, takings, self-assessment, land assembly
JEL Classification: K11, R52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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