Rejecting the Inter-American Court: Judicialization, National Courts, and Regional Human Rights

CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICAN, Javier Couso, Alexandra Huneeus and Rachel Sieder, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2010

Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1167

28 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2011

Date Written: August 17, 2011

Abstract

This book chapter generates theories about when high courts comply with Inter-American Court rulings. In over one-half of the rulings it has issued since it began its work in 1979, the IACtHR issues orders that require action by national courts. Further, it has increasingly taken on a role of reviewing whether national practices of judicial independence and due process comply with the American Convention on Human Rights. The chapter seeks to discern the factors that influence how national high courts respond to this incursion into their turf, and whether they act as a partner in regional legal integration by complying with the IACtHR's decisions. It examines recent instances in which the high courts of Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela reject a ruling of the Inter-American Court.

Keywords: Judicialization of Politics, Judicial politics, Latin America, Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, legal culture, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation

Huneeus, Alexandra Valeria, Rejecting the Inter-American Court: Judicialization, National Courts, and Regional Human Rights (August 17, 2011). CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICAN, Javier Couso, Alexandra Huneeus and Rachel Sieder, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2010, Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1167, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1911383

Alexandra Valeria Huneeus (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin Law School ( email )

975 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States

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