50 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2011
Date Written: September 2012
An upstream manufacturer can use minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors. RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers. If entry is accommodated, upstream competition leads to fierce down-stream competition and the breakdown of RPM. Hence, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Retailers may prefer not to accommodate entry; and, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We also discuss empirical and policy implications, as well as the exclusion-ary potential of other methods of sharing prots between upstream and downstream firms, such as slotting fees and revenue sharing.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Asker, John and Bar-Isaac, Heski, Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance (September 2012). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31609. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1911714
By Tim Brennan