Wages and Incentives in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century Australian Banking Industry

International Journal of Development and Conflict (IJDC), World Scientific, 2011

Posted: 22 Aug 2011

See all articles by Andrew Seltzer

Andrew Seltzer

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2011

Abstract

This paper summarises research on the mechanisms used by banks to align the interests of their workers with the goal of long-term profit maximization. Banking was characterised by moral hazard, and the monitoring technology of the period was far from perfect. The banks incentivized the workers by establishing well-defined career structures within internal labour markets, by strongly tying salary to tenure and attaching large salary increases to promotion. A worker who quit or was dismissed was punished with a considerable loss of lifetime earnings. Conversely, one who exceeded the norms was rewarded by substantial earnings growth associated with seniority and promotion.

Keywords: Compensation, careers, banking, personnel

Suggested Citation

Seltzer, Andrew, Wages and Incentives in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century Australian Banking Industry (April 1, 2011). International Journal of Development and Conflict (IJDC), World Scientific, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1914066

Andrew Seltzer (Contact Author)

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

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