Geography of the Family

WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. FS IV 01 – 16

40 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2011

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Harald Künemund

University of Vechta

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Julio R. Robledo

Ruhr University of Bochum

Date Written: September 1, 2001

Abstract

We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. The first-born child’s location choice influences the behavior of the second-born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other. These strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second-born children. We also analyze the location choices empirically using German data. These data confirm our theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Family public goods, voluntary intergenerational transfers

JEL Classification: H41, J10

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Künemund, Harald and Lommerud, Kjell Erik and Robledo, Julio R., Geography of the Family (September 1, 2001). WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. FS IV 01 – 16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1914356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1914356

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Harald Künemund

University of Vechta ( email )

Driverstr. 22
Vechta, 49377
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-vechta.de

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 5 558 9209 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Julio R. Robledo

Ruhr University of Bochum ( email )

University Bochum GC 3/150
Bochum, 44780
Germany

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