Inter-Market Competition and Bank Loan Spreads: Evidence from The Securities Offering Reform
37 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2011 Last revised: 3 Aug 2018
Date Written: June 15, 2018
Abstract
I provide evidence of a new mechanism by which access to public securities mitigates the bank hold-up problem and reduces loan spreads – it increases a borrower’s bargaining power vis-à-vis a lender by offering a bank loan substitute. Difference-in-differences results indicate that loan spreads decline following legislation that makes public securities more attractive, but only when public securities represent a credible substitute for the bank loan (i.e., for term loans taken out by credit rated borrowers). Spreads on revolving lines of credit, which are more complementary with public securities, increase.
Keywords: Bank Loans, Bank Competition, Banking Relationships, Public Debt Market, Shelf Registrations
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