Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 11-22

40 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2011 Last revised: 30 Jun 2020

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Claude Fluet

Université Laval

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Date Written: August 24, 2011

Abstract

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure where it is for the arbiter to decide how much testimony he wants to hear.

Keywords: Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

JEL Classification: D82, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude-Denys, Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony (August 24, 2011). CIRPEE Working Paper No. 11-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1916029 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916029

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Claude-Denys Fluet (Contact Author)

Université Laval ( email )

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