Trust in Decision-Making Authorities Dictates the Form of the Interactive Relationship Between Outcome Favorability and Procedural Fairness

45 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2011

See all articles by Joel Brockner

Joel Brockner

Columbia Business School

Emily Bianchi

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kees van den Bos

Utrecht University - Department of Social and Organizational Psychology; Utrecht University - Faculty of Law

Philip K. Miles

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Matthias Seifert

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Henry Moon

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 10, 2010

Abstract

Five studies demonstrate that employees’ trust in management influences the form of the interactive effect of outcome favorability and procedural fairness on employees’ attitudes and behavioral intentions. When trust is high, employees respond particularly negatively when outcome favorability and procedural fairness are both low whereas when trust is low, employees respond especially positively when outcome favorability and procedural fairness are both high.These findings suggest that employees use trust-based expectations of how management will treat them as a lens through which to interpret and respond to their actual treatment. Implications for the organizational justice and trust literature's are discussed.

Suggested Citation

Brockner, Joel and Bianchi, Emily and van den Bos, Kees and Miles, Philip K. and Seifert, Matthias and Moon, Henry, Trust in Decision-Making Authorities Dictates the Form of the Interactive Relationship Between Outcome Favorability and Procedural Fairness (September 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1916220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916220

Joel Brockner (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-4435 (Phone)
212-316-9355 (Fax)

Emily Bianchi

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Kees Van den Bos

Utrecht University - Department of Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

P.O. Box 80.140
3508 TC Utrecht
Netherlands
+31 30 253 3460 (Phone)
+31 30 253.7584 (Fax)

Utrecht University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Janskerkhof 3
Utrecht, 3512 BK
Netherlands

Philip K. Miles

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Matthias Seifert

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Henry Moon

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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