Law, Economics and History: Endogenous Institutional Change and Legal Innovation

19 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2011 Last revised: 4 Sep 2011

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Faculty of Law

Carmine Guerriero

Department of Economics, University of Bologna

Date Written: August 25, 2011

Abstract

Understanding the origins of formal and informal institutions of cooperation and regulation and their long-lasting impact on market exchange and technological investment is one of the most pressing questions in law, economics and history. Accordingly, despite the different angles considered by different disciplines, the notion that institutions emerge endogenously in the face of both welfare-enhancing and rent-seeking motives has recently come to be an accepted paradigm. Yet, despite this convergence, an even more vigorous effort in inquiring the determinants and the effects of institutional change is needed in order to guide legal and institutional reforms. The aim of this chapter is to substantiate this desideratum and, at the same time, to provide a new interdisciplinary research agenda.

Keywords: endogenous institutions, legal origins, legal innovation, democracy, corporate form

JEL Classification: K4, N2, O4, P50

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Guerriero, Carmine, Law, Economics and History: Endogenous Institutional Change and Legal Innovation (August 25, 2011). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-18, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1916588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916588

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Faculty of Law ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
Netherlands

Carmine Guerriero

Department of Economics, University of Bologna ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

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