The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families

25 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2011 Last revised: 30 Aug 2011

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law

Date Written: July 25, 2011

Abstract

Many legal economists have suggested that the common law system is more conducive to economic growth than the civil law system. Such literature has been popularized within the legal origins movement. From the perspective of such literature, the existence of hybrid, pluralist or mixed legal jurisdictions is a puzzle. Why has civil law persisted while common law is more efficient?

This paper discusses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis from the perspective of hybrid jurisdictions. We argue that the complexities of legal systems require a more nuanced analysis. The consequence is that there is no single efficient outcome, thus undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Gómez Ligüerre, Carlos, The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed Legal Families (July 25, 2011). Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2012; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-31. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1916766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916766

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

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