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A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout

40 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2011 Last revised: 14 Feb 2014

Melis Kartal

University of Vienna

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 17, 2014

Abstract

I investigate the welfare properties of a broad class of electoral systems with endogenous turnout. I find that the welfare ranking of electoral systems depends on the composition of the electorate. If citizens have identical voting costs, then all electoral systems that satisfy certain regularity properties generate the same level of welfare. If voting costs are heterogeneous, and the two parties are (almost) equally popular, then majority rule generates the highest welfare among these systems. I also analyse a model with heterogeneous and group-specific costs. I show that, under certain conditions, proportional representation dominates majority rule.

Keywords: electoral systems, turnout, welfare, costly voting

Suggested Citation

Kartal, Melis, A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout (January 17, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1916895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916895

Melis Kartal (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://files.nyu.edu/mk2672/public/

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