An Empirical Examination of Stakeholder Groups as Monitoring Sources in Corporate Governance

28 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2011

See all articles by Cassandra R. Cole

Cassandra R. Cole

Florida State University - College of Business

Enya He

Independent

Kathleen A. McCullough

Florida State University - College of Business

Anastasia Semykina

Florida State University

David W. Sommer

St. Mary's University; University of Georgia - Department of Insurance, Legal Studies, Real Estate

Date Written: September 2011

Abstract

Insurers are formally and informally monitored by a variety of stakeholders, including reinsurers, agents, outside board members, and regulators. While other studies have generally examined these stakeholders separately, they have not accounted for the fact that there is some relation among the stakeholder groups, and the presence of these groups is likely to be jointly determined. By empirically controlling for these potential interrelations, we create a more complete assessment of the impact of these stakeholders/monitors on insurers’ risk taking. Specifically, we find that the presence of some stakeholders offsets the degree or presence of others, and that most stakeholders/monitors are associated with a reduction of overall firm risk.

Suggested Citation

Cole, Cassandra R. and He, Enya and McCullough, Kathleen A. and Semykina, Anastasia and Sommer, David W., An Empirical Examination of Stakeholder Groups as Monitoring Sources in Corporate Governance (September 2011). Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 78, Issue 3, pp. 703-730, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1917915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01428.x

Cassandra R. Cole (Contact Author)

Florida State University - College of Business ( email )

423 Rovetta Business Building
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States

Enya He

Independent

Kathleen A. McCullough

Florida State University - College of Business ( email )

Department of Risk Management and Insurance
150 Rovetta Business Building
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States
850-644-8358 (Phone)
850-644-4077 (Fax)

Anastasia Semykina

Florida State University ( email )

Tallahasse, FL 32306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mailer.fsu.edu/~asemykina/

David W. Sommer

St. Mary's University ( email )

1 Camino Santa Maria
San Antonio, TX 78023
United States
210-431-8055 (Phone)

University of Georgia - Department of Insurance, Legal Studies, Real Estate ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
706-542-5160 (Phone)
706-542-4295 (Fax)

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