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Managerial Control of Business Press Coverage

David H. Solomon

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Eugene F. Soltes

Harvard Business School

October 3, 2012

The business press plays a significant role in distributing firm news to investors. We investigate the extent to which managers can influence their firm’s level of coverage in newswires and newspapers. We consider three choices under managerial control: press release timing, press wire service, and ease of firm access. We find evidence that issuing press releases during the day instead of the evening increases the probability of coverage in both newspapers and newswires. Nonetheless, the largest determinants of coverage are firm and news specific factors which lie outside managerial control. We also examine how media incentives affect coverage choices. We find that newspapers, but not newswires, are more likely to cover negative news which suggests that papers cover particular business events for reasons other than informativeness.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: August 28, 2011 ; Last revised: October 8, 2012

Suggested Citation

Solomon, David H. and Soltes, Eugene F., Managerial Control of Business Press Coverage (October 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1918138 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1918138

Contact Information

David H. Solomon
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
Eugene F. Soltes (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
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