Managerial Control of Business Press Coverage

33 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2011 Last revised: 8 Oct 2012

See all articles by David H. Solomon

David H. Solomon

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Eugene F. Soltes

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: October 3, 2012

Abstract

The business press plays a significant role in distributing firm news to investors. We investigate the extent to which managers can influence their firm’s level of coverage in newswires and newspapers. We consider three choices under managerial control: press release timing, press wire service, and ease of firm access. We find evidence that issuing press releases during the day instead of the evening increases the probability of coverage in both newspapers and newswires. Nonetheless, the largest determinants of coverage are firm and news specific factors which lie outside managerial control. We also examine how media incentives affect coverage choices. We find that newspapers, but not newswires, are more likely to cover negative news which suggests that papers cover particular business events for reasons other than informativeness.

Suggested Citation

Solomon, David H. and Soltes, Eugene F., Managerial Control of Business Press Coverage (October 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1918138 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1918138

David H. Solomon

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Eugene F. Soltes (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

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