Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question - Compromise Strategies in Constitutional Argumentations about the Concept of Sovereignty for the European Integration

European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 375-397, 2006

17 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2011 Last revised: 12 Nov 2011

Date Written: August 28, 2007

Abstract

The paper examines whether the compromise strategies applied originally for the internal aspect can be used ana-logically for the problems of the external aspect posed by European integration, or whether there are other conceptual ways to go. Its conclusion concerning the European sovereignty debate is that we should not try to answer the sovereignty question (i.e., the question on the conflict between European integration and national sovereignty), because every answer is unacceptable for at least one of the interested parties. Our lawyerly task is to construe a legal uncertainty as to the legal outcome of a conflict (by developing complicated conceptual constructs which make virtually impossible the straight use of the sovereignty argument) and to give practical methods how to avoid the conflicts, so no one risks the conflict but everyone rather cooperates.

Keywords: sovereignty, European Union, legal theory, constitutional law

JEL Classification: K10

Suggested Citation

Jakab, Andras, Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question - Compromise Strategies in Constitutional Argumentations about the Concept of Sovereignty for the European Integration (August 28, 2007). European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 375-397, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1918416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1918416

Andras Jakab (Contact Author)

University of Salzburg ( email )

Kapitelgasse 5-7.
Salzburg, 5020
Austria

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