Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

41 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2011

See all articles by Judd B. Kessler

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: August 2011

Abstract

Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor, and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.

Suggested Citation

Kessler, Judd B. and Roth, Alvin E., Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate (August 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17324. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1918654

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1671/

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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