25 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2011
Date Written: August 2011
Three well‐known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Pais, Joana and Pintér, Ágnes and Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc, College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study (August 2011). International Economic Review, Vol. 52, Issue 3, pp. 713-737, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1919401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x
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