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College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study

25 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2011  

Joana Pais

Universidade de Lisboa, School of Economics and Management and UECE -- Research Unit on Complexity in Economics

Ágnes Pintér

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Róbert Ferenc Veszteg

Universidad de Navarra

Date Written: August 2011

Abstract

Three well‐known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

Suggested Citation

Pais, Joana and Pintér, Ágnes and Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc, College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study (August 2011). International Economic Review, Vol. 52, Issue 3, pp. 713-737, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1919401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00647.x

Joana Pais (Contact Author)

Universidade de Lisboa, School of Economics and Management and UECE -- Research Unit on Complexity in Economics ( email )

Rua do Quelhas 6
Lisboa, 1200-781
Portugal

Ágnes Pintér

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Campus Cantoblanco
C/Kelsen, 1
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain

Róbert Ferenc Veszteg

Universidad de Navarra ( email )

Campus Universitario
Edificio Bibliotecas (Entrada Este)
Pamplona, Navarra 31080
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.unav.es/ecoprof/rveszteg/

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