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Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets

Posted: 31 Aug 2011  

Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP); Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; NBER

Date Written: September 2011

Abstract

We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken in the recent literature.

Suggested Citation

Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Mian, Atif R., Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets (September 2011). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 579-600, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1920096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080310

Asim Ijaz Khwaja (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-7790 (Phone)
617-496-5960 (Fax)

Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP) ( email )

Via Real Collegio, 30
Moncalieri, Turin 10024
Italy

Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) ( email )

Duke University
Durham, NC 90097
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Atif R. Mian

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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