The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J.M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism

International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 20, No. 2, April-June 2012, pp. 278-310

71 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2011 Last revised: 4 Sep 2012

See all articles by Michael Emmett Brady

Michael Emmett Brady

California State University, Dominguez Hills

Date Written: August 31, 2011

Abstract

Economists have been unable to comprehend the logical framework of Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability (1921) and General Theory (1936). This is due to their failure to read both works in their entirety. Instead, they concentrate on the first three chapters of Part I of the General Theory or the Treatise. This can be attributed to an “approach” to philosophy which rejects any type of formal, analytical, logical technique in favor of a purely speculative approach that eventually leads down the road to a priorism and subjectism.

Keynes's decision approach is based on the general case of non-linearity and non-additivity. His decision theory incorporates neoclassical decision theory as a special case.

Keywords: nonlinearity, nonadditivity, conventional coefficient of weight and risk

JEL Classification: B23, B41, E12

Suggested Citation

Brady, Michael Emmett, The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J.M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism (August 31, 2011). International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 20, No. 2, April-June 2012, pp. 278-310. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1920578 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1920578

Michael Emmett Brady (Contact Author)

California State University, Dominguez Hills ( email )

1000 E. Victoria Street, Carson, CA
Carson, CA 90747
United States

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