The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J.M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 20, No. 2, April-June 2012, pp. 278-310
71 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2011 Last revised: 4 Sep 2012
Date Written: August 31, 2011
Economists have been unable to comprehend the logical framework of Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability (1921) and General Theory (1936). This is due to their failure to read both works in their entirety. Instead, they concentrate on the first three chapters of Part I of the General Theory or the Treatise. This can be attributed to an “approach” to philosophy which rejects any type of formal, analytical, logical technique in favor of a purely speculative approach that eventually leads down the road to a priorism and subjectism.
Keynes's decision approach is based on the general case of non-linearity and non-additivity. His decision theory incorporates neoclassical decision theory as a special case.
Keywords: nonlinearity, nonadditivity, conventional coefficient of weight and risk
JEL Classification: B23, B41, E12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation