Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

27 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2011

See all articles by Elena Cettolin

Elena Cettolin

Maastricht University

Arno Riedl

Maastricht University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Netspar

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 31, 2011

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination with conditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested in the behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditional cooperation is not a strong enough force to increase contribution levels. Although, non-coerced subjects rationally adjust their beliefs about contribution behavior of coerced subjects they do not increase their own contributions to the public good accordingly. This points to the limits of the actual strength of conditional cooperation and puts some doubt on the idea that it is crucial in overcoming social dilemma problems.

Keywords: coercion, public goods, commitment, laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: C910, D020, D030, H410

Suggested Citation

Cettolin, Elena and Riedl, Arno M., Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods (August 31, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3556, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1920667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1920667

Elena Cettolin

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

Arno M. Riedl (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Microeconomics & Public Economics
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.arnoriedl.com

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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