Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

23 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 1999

See all articles by Ugo Panizza

Ugo Panizza

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics; CEPR

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1999

Abstract

This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality

JEL Classification: K1, O1

Suggested Citation

Panizza, Ugo, Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality (September 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=192113 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.192113

Ugo Panizza (Contact Author)

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics ( email )

Geneva Avenue de la Paix 11A
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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