Big Experimenter is Watching You! Anonymity and Prosocial Behavior in the Laboratory

30 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2011

See all articles by Franziska Barmettler

Franziska Barmettler

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Christian Zehnder

University of Lausanne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Social preference research has received considerable attention in recent years. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important implications in many economic domains. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our data does not support the hypothesis that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity affects observed prosocial behavior. We do not observe significant effects of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior in any of our games.

Keywords: laboratory experiments, anonymity, scrutiny, prosocial behavior

JEL Classification: C91, D03

Suggested Citation

Barmettler, Franziska and Fehr, Ernst and Zehnder, Christian, Big Experimenter is Watching You! Anonymity and Prosocial Behavior in the Laboratory. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5925. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1921976

Franziska Barmettler (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Bl├╝mlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

Christian Zehnder

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

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