Philosophical Psychology, 26(5): 629-638
16 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2011 Last revised: 27 Nov 2013
Date Written: September 6, 2011
Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people’s moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
Keywords: intuition, expertise defense, actor-observer bias
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Tobia, Kevin Patrick and Buckwalter, Wesley and Stich, Stephen, Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts? (September 6, 2011). Philosophical Psychology, 26(5): 629-638. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1923260 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1923260