Consumer Learning and Time-locked Trials of Software Products

Journal of Management Information Systems, Fall 2013, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 239–267

Posted: 8 Sep 2011 Last revised: 19 Apr 2014

See all articles by Debabrata Dey

Debabrata Dey

University of Kansas - School of Business

Atanu Lahiri

University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management

Dengpan Liu

University of Alabama in Huntsville - College of Business Administration

Date Written: April 5, 2013

Abstract

The usefulness of a software product becomes obvious to consumers only after they get to experience it and, upon experiencing it, they may reach different conclusions regarding its true value. We examine the problem of designing free software trials under a general learning function. Our analyses lead to several new findings. We find that a time-locked trial is optimal only when the rate of learning is sufficiently large. It is not optimal in other situations, even when it has an overall positive effect on consumers’ valuations. We also find that positive network effects have a minimal impact on this optimality. Interestingly, we find that neither the optimal trial period nor the optimal price is monotonically increasing in the rate of learning. At moderate rates, the software manufacturer pursues a dual strategy of offering a longer trial as well as a lower price. At higher rates of learning, the manufacturer does the opposite. Our results are robust, and incorporating possibilities such as a trial providing a signal of quality or learning being correlated with prior valuation has little impact on their applicability.

Keywords: Consumer learning, experience goods, free trial, network effects, signaling, software trial, time-locked trial

Suggested Citation

Dey, Debabrata and Lahiri, Atanu and Liu, Dengpan, Consumer Learning and Time-locked Trials of Software Products (April 5, 2013). Journal of Management Information Systems, Fall 2013, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 239–267, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1923264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1923264

Debabrata Dey (Contact Author)

University of Kansas - School of Business ( email )

Capitol Federal Hall
1654 Naismith Dr
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States
785-864-1895 (Phone)

Atanu Lahiri

University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

Dengpan Liu

University of Alabama in Huntsville - College of Business Administration ( email )

Huntsville, AL 35899
United States
2568246826 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cba.uah.edu/is/liu

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