Educational Spillovers at the Firm Level: Who Benefits from Whom?

Swiss Leading House Working Paper No. 65

22 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2011

See all articles by Uschi Backes-Gellner

Uschi Backes-Gellner

University of Zurich - Institute for Business Administration; Swiss Leading House

Christian Rupietta

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW); University of Zurich - Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies

Simone N. Tuor Sartore

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration; University of Zurich - Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies

Date Written: August 1, 2011

Abstract

This paper examines spillover effects from education at the firm level, separating the effects for different levels and types of education and allowing for a curvilinear relationship. Modeling a Cobb-Douglas production function, we show that wages of tertiary-educated workers depend positively on the number of workers with an apprenticeship degree. These effects are the result of informational spillovers between differently educated workers. We estimate an aggregated Mincerian earnings equation using data from a large employer-employee survey and account for firm fixed effects as well as endogeneous workforce composition. Our results are highly significant and robust throughout our specifications and show that the number of workers with an apprenticeship degree has a positive impact on average wages of tertiary-educated workers but with a decreasing rate.

Keywords: education, informational spillovers, wages

JEL Classification: I20, J24, J30

Suggested Citation

Backes-Gellner, Uschi and Rupietta, Christian and Tuor Sartore, Simone N., Educational Spillovers at the Firm Level: Who Benefits from Whom? (August 1, 2011). Swiss Leading House Working Paper No. 65, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1924809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1924809

Uschi Backes-Gellner

University of Zurich - Institute for Business Administration ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
8032 Zurich
Switzerland
+41 44 6344281 (Phone)
+41 44 6344370 (Fax)

Swiss Leading House ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Christian Rupietta (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

University of Zurich - Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Simone N. Tuor Sartore

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
+ 41 - 44 - 6345192 (Phone)
+ 41 - 44 - 6344370 (Fax)

University of Zurich - Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies ( email )

Switzerland

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