Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
27 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2011
Date Written: July 31, 2011
This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier's (2009) work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment includes the role of a potential entrant (a fourth passive player). Our findings are as follows. First, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. Second, communication between the potential entrant and the buyers increases buyers' coordination on their preferred equilibrium (equilibrium with entry) and hence, reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers.
Keywords: Exclusive Dealing, Coordination Games, Experiments, Contracting with Externalities, Bargaining with Externalities, Social Preferences, Reciprocity, Intentionality, Regard for Others, Social Proximity, Antitrust
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D62, D86, K12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Landeo, Claudia M. and Spier, Kathryn E., Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results (July 31, 2011). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1924941