23 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2011
Date Written: May 30, 2011
We consider a single-period, pure-exchange setting with a single trading date and a single consumption date. Investors are uncertain about the risk aversion of the other investors participating in the capital market, implying that the market’s aggregate risk aversion is a random variable. Unlike the setting where investors are fully informed about the market’s aggregate risk aversion, we find that investors can have a strict preference for releasing public information prior to trading. In particular, we identify conditions under which the information risk problem does not arise. Our study complements other research into the source of value for publicly reported accounting information.
Keywords: public information, equilibrium, unkown risk aversion
JEL Classification: D81, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hofmann, Christian and Loeffler, Andreas, Public Information and Unknown Capital Market Participants (May 30, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1926245 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1926245