Role-Dependent Social Preferences

Economica 2016

37 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2011 Last revised: 30 Apr 2016

See all articles by Friedel Bolle

Friedel Bolle

European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)

Philipp E. Otto

European University Viadrina


Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according to the players' strength combination. Simple 1x1 bargaining experiments from the literature are discussed, and 2x2 as well as 2x3 assignment market experiments with possible renegotiations are investigated. The assumption that players adopt preferences for two to five roles, defined by strength combinations of the two bargainers, explains the experimental results better than individually constant preferences.

Keywords: experimental matching, role adoption, altruistic core

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D63, D64

Suggested Citation

Bolle, Friedel and Otto, Philipp E., Role-Dependent Social Preferences. Economica 2016, Available at SSRN: or

Friedel Bolle

European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) ( email )

Lehrstuhl Volkswirtschaftslehre Insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie
D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder)

Philipp E. Otto (Contact Author)

European University Viadrina ( email )

Microeconomics Department
Grosse Scharrnstr. 59
D-15230 Frankfurt (Oder)

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