The Marketing of Environmental Treaties: Non-Binding Signature as Information and Raising Public Awareness

57 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2011 Last revised: 1 Jul 2014

Date Written: November 23, 2011

Abstract

Research has demonstrated that state executives may use their non-binding signature power to claim value from environmental treaties in the form of obtaining ego rents and in response to international pressures. This paper advances the literature by demonstrating how the attachment of signature also has the capacity to alter the dynamics of the ratification decision which follows it. Multilevel modeling on a dataset of 49 environmental treaties agreed between 1980 and 2000 is used to demonstrate that the state executive’s non-binding signature helps to overcome the information asymmetry regarding treaty design faced by the ratification actors and to politicize the treaty itself, making ratification more likely in wealthy states.

Keywords: Ratification, Environment, Signature, Multilevel Models, Treaties

Suggested Citation

Leinaweaver, Justin, The Marketing of Environmental Treaties: Non-Binding Signature as Information and Raising Public Awareness (November 23, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1927201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1927201

Justin Leinaweaver (Contact Author)

Drury University ( email )

900 N. Benton
Springfield, MO 65802
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.justinleinaweaver.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
57
Abstract Views
648
rank
490,491
PlumX Metrics