Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms

35 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2011

See all articles by Giovanni Facchini

Giovanni Facchini

University of Milan - Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano (LdA)

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Date Written: September 1, 2011

Abstract

Does policymakers’ horizon affect their willingness to support economic reforms? Voting in the U.S. Congress provides an ideal setting to address this question. Differences between the House and Senate, in which members serve two-year and six-year mandates respectively, allow to examine the role of term length; the staggered structure of the Senate allows to compare the behavior of different “generations” of senators and study the impact of election proximity. Considering all major trade liberalization reforms undertaken by the U.S. since the early 1970’s, we find that Senate members are more likely to support them than House members. However, inter-cameral differences disappear for third-generation senators, who face re-election at the same time as House members. Considering Senate votes alone, we find that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two and this result holds both when comparing different senators voting on the same bill, as well as individual senators voting on different bills. Inter-generational differences disappear instead for senators who hold safe seats or have announced their retirement, indicating that the protectionist effect of election proximity is driven by legislators’ fear of losing office.

Keywords: D72, F10

JEL Classification: Term Length, Election Proximity, Trade Reforms

Suggested Citation

Facchini, Giovanni and Zanardi, Maurizio and Conconi, Paola, Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms (September 1, 2011). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 311, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930305

Giovanni Facchini (Contact Author)

University of Milan - Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano (LdA) ( email )

Via P. Amedeo 34
Milano, 20122
Italy

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
38
Abstract Views
498
PlumX Metrics