Representation of Non-transferable Utility Games by Coalition Production Economies

31 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2011 Last revised: 28 Dec 2012

Tomoki Inoue

Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics

Date Written: December 28, 2012

Abstract

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.

Keywords: Inner core, coalition production economy, balancedness, Walrasian equilibrium

JEL Classification: D51, C71

Suggested Citation

Inoue, Tomoki, Representation of Non-transferable Utility Games by Coalition Production Economies (December 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930319 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930319

Tomoki Inoue (Contact Author)

Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )

1-1 Kanda-Surugadai
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301
Japan

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