Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context

33 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2011

See all articles by Cristie Ford

Cristie Ford

Peter A. Allard School of Law

David Hess

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

Over the last few years, it has become increasingly common for government agencies to resolve corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations through the use of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others, we find that these monitorships are failing to meet their full potential in reforming corrupt corporate cultures. After reviewing potential reforms to improve monitorships from a new governance perspective, we discuss the limits of these reforms that are due to the sociological and institutional environment in which monitorships are embedded.

Suggested Citation

Ford, Cristie L. and Hess, David, Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context (October 2011). Law & Policy, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 509-541, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2011.00347.x

Cristie L. Ford (Contact Author)

Peter A. Allard School of Law ( email )

University of British Columbia
1822 East Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z1
Canada

David Hess

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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