Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context
33 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2011
There are 2 versions of this paper
Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context
Date Written: October 2011
Abstract
Over the last few years, it has become increasingly common for government agencies to resolve corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations through the use of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others, we find that these monitorships are failing to meet their full potential in reforming corrupt corporate cultures. After reviewing potential reforms to improve monitorships from a new governance perspective, we discuss the limits of these reforms that are due to the sociological and institutional environment in which monitorships are embedded.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Register to save articles to
your library
Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: j-9930.pdf
Size: 217K
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
