Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance

Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266

31 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2011

See all articles by John Armour

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simon Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Suzanne J. Konzelmann

University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2003

Abstract

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favor stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.

Keywords: corporate governance, stakeholding, hostile takeovers, company law, insolvency, employee representation, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G33, G34, K22, K31

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Deakin, Simon F. and Konzelmann, Suzanne J., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance (June 1, 2003). Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930885

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

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University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Simon F. Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

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Suzanne J. Konzelmann (Contact Author)

University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology ( email )

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London, WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 207 631 6799 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bbk.ac.uk/management/our-staff/academics/konzelmann

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences ( email )

ESRC Centre for Business Research
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United Kingdom
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